Getting the measure of Murdoch's Good by Cumhaill, Clare Mac
Forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy 
 
Please cite published version 
 
 
Getting the measure of Murdoch’s Good 
 
“It is the traditional inspiration of the philosopher, 
but also his traditional vice, to believe that all is one” 
 
Murdoch ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’ 
 
Clare Mac Cumhaill 
Durham University 
clare.maccumhaill@dur.ac.uk 
 
 
§1. The idea 
 
In the first essay in The Sovereignty of Good, ‘The Idea of Perfection’, Murdoch deploys a bit of arcane 
idiom that is easy to pass over without much hesitation. With only a few exceptions, the passage 
in which it appears, close to the start of the part of the essay that sees Murdoch develop her 
positive proposal, has drawn little critical assessment.1 Murdoch’s alternative ‘soul-picture’ is  
pitched against a neo-Kantian existentialist, behaviorist position (whose ethics and politics are 
utilitarian and ‘democratic’ (p.9)) which she sees as fueled by a genetic – and for her faulty - analysis 
of concepts: Concepts are understood to have a structure that is public, grasp of which is a skill; 
ordinary words for concepts are learned from observation of some ‘typical outward behavior 
pattern’; in the case of moral concepts, ‘to copy a right action is to act rightly’. This latter is the 
view of Stuart Hampshire to whom Sovereignty is dedicated; but, she writes, while ‘this is all very 
well to say’, the question still arises: ‘What is the form that I am supposed to copy?’2 (p.30). She 
finds she wants to attack this ‘heavily fortified’ (p.16) position: ‘I am not content’ (ibid.)  
 Her alternative will be sketched out, though incompletely, in the rest of the paper. For 
now, a partial summary: Concepts have a complicated structure, a grasp of which is private and 
necessarily fallible. There is no skill a public display of which is a criterion of concept possession. 
Instead, concepts shift and alter – “we have a different image of courage at forty from that which 
we had at twenty” (p.29). Words may mislead here; “words are often stable while concepts alter” 
(ibid.). Concepts deepen. They acquire structure over time, their inter-relations shift and ramify 
but always in ways that are personal. This is since concepts that historical individuals have - and 
express in thought and action - only acquire structure in the context of the progressing life of a 
person (p.26); the full extent of what courage is for me and means to me will depend on the 
historical individual I am and the life I have lead. But unlike the existentialist Kantian ego which 
appears only at crucial moments of choice, quick as the flash of needle3, the progress of the life of 
a person, someone with a ‘live personality’, involves more than outward behavior. It involves inner, 
private conscious reflective activity. It involves the continuous reassessment of past events, 
relationships and individuals. And, as concepts deepen, it involves redescription (p.26) – what looked 
courageous at twenty may seem foolhardy at forty. Such reassessment and the redescription that 
it involves is moral work; it is an attempt to see and understand things clearly. It is not a skill that 
can be exercised at isolated moments, but an endless task, one that is regulated by the eponymous 
ideal limit – the idea of perfection. For instance, a perfected idea of courage would be a full 
understanding of what ‘courage’ is, its relation to other the virtues and to human life, an 
understanding which is unattainable, try as the historical individual imperfectly may. This activity 
is not parasitic on the outer. It is serious. You have to do it for yourself, if not by yourself.  
 Here is the passage: 
 
 None of what I am saying here is particularly new: similar things have been said by 
 philosophers from Plato onward; and appear as commonplaces of the Christian ethic, 
 whose centre is an individual. To come nearer home in the Platonic tradition, the present 
 dispute is reminiscent of the old arguments about abstract and concrete universals. My 
 view might be put by saying: moral terms must be treated as concrete universals. And if 
 someone at this point were to say, well, why stop at moral concepts, why not claim that 
 all universals are concrete, I would reply, why not indeed? Why not consider red as an 
 ideal end-point, as a concept infinitely to be learned, as an individual object of love?
 (p.29) 
 
 In this paper I hardly talk about love, something which is so central to Murdoch’s 
alternative ‘soul-picture’. Instead, I say something about her easy-to-miss appeal to the concrete 
universal, a notion now almost banished from contemporary discussion. For there is reason to 
think that Murdoch’s conception of the concrete universal is inflected more by British Idealism 
than by Hegel directly, though this inflection is not explicit (“I am not, in spite of the philosophical 
backing which I might here resort to, suggesting anything in the least esoteric” (p.30)) - and this 
difference is philosophically significant. But, as I show, it is also inflected by Wittgenstein in ways 
I try to illustrate in the middle part of the paper. Following Murdoch’s tendency, method even, I 
draw an analogy. I want to suggest that Wittgenstein’s discussion of the Standard Metre in the 
Philosophical Investigations helps get the measure of what Murdoch is up to with her talk of ‘concrete 
universality’ and ultimately too of the Good, more a concern of the other two papers that make 
up Sovereignty: ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’, and ‘The Sovereignty of the Good over Other Concepts’ as 
well her of 1992 masterpiece Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. I then introduce a hopefully not 
terminal problem for my exegesis and so for the analogy: Murdoch is not wholly sympathetic to 
all aspects of Wittgenstein’s program.  
 In the last part of the paper, I offer a way around this problem by picking up a different 
Wittgensteinean strand. This could have been lifted from Murdoch’s own work but instead I 
appeal to Chapter 13 of The Problem of Metaphysics by Donald MacKinnon, Murdoch’s tutor while 
an undergraduate at Oxford (and later Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at Cambridge). This 
work originated in Gifford Lectures delivered in 1965 and 1966 and was published in 1974. 
Murdoch’s Archive at Kingston University contains her copy with its characteristic notes, 
handwritten on spare intervals of blank page. Her Gifford Lectures, later Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals (MGM), were delivered in 1982 and published ten years later. MacKinnon isn’t cited but 
his ‘problem’ of metaphysics echoes hers, and hers his - ‘The Idea of Perfection’ was first published 
in 1964 and perhaps he read it. No scholarly work has been done on MacKinnon and Murdoch’s 
intellectual relationship and I can only hint at overlaps here, a strategy that is justified I think by 
the content of my argument, and by the passage above, around which the whole paper spins. 4 
 
§1. Some questions 
 
Three questions immediately arise on reading the passage above. Which ‘old arguments’? How 
‘near to home’? Why moral terms? Start with the first.   
 Murdoch is referring to the problem of individuality, though this might not at once be 
clear from its textual setting (I’ll return to this issue in §4 when I pick up her reference to the 
‘Christian’ ethic). This problem concerns what makes something individual, an individual, a unified 
entity distinct from other individuals. Two distinct roses could instantiate all the same properties 
– both might be red, have variegated petals, the ‘same’ damask scent and so on; they might be 
qualitatively identical in all respects. What makes them distinct over and above the properties they 
instantiate?  
 Two classes of solution have been proposed: non-qualitative and qualitative. The notion 
of a trope belongs to the latter class, as does bundle theory (roughly, what matters is the way the 
properties are bundled together). Among non-qualitative solutions are appeal to a bare substratum 
or to space; what they qualify or where they are is what makes two otherwise qualitatively identical 
individuals numerically distinct. Invoking a mysterious haecceity is a further option.  
 Hegel’s Logic Book III offers a new response and with a different kind of foundation. Hegel 
urges that we need a conception of universality whereby the universal which the individual 
exemplifies is not merely accidental but is constitutive of it. He introduces the notion of a 
substance universal. ‘Rose’ is a substance universal - it is essential to a rose that it instantiate the 
substance universal ‘rose’. This contrasts with ‘red’ which is an abstract universal.  
 When we say: ‘This rose is red,’ the copula ‘is’ implies that subject and predicate agree 
 with one another. But, of course, the rose, being something concrete, is not merely red; 
 on the contrary, it also has a scent, a definite form, and all manner of other features, 
 which are not contained within the predicate ‘red’. On the other hand, the predicate, 
 being something abstractly universal, does not belong merely to this subject.  For 
 there are other flowers, too, and other objects altogether that are also red (Hegel, 
 Encyclopaedia Logic, §172 Addition, p.250)5 
 So, while there may be other flowers, only roses instantiate the substance universal ‘rose’ 
and this explains why an individual, as an individual of a certain kind, instantiates some of the 
particular properties it does, for instance having a damask scent. Nevertheless, there are different 
ways the same substance universal can be – an individual is a rose in its own determinate way in virtue 
of instantiating different properties (or the same properties differently; its variegated leaves have a 
peculiar variegation that is particular to it). And likewise in the case of the human: 
[E]ach human being though infinitely unique is so precisely because [he or she is a human 
being] and each individual is such an individual primarily because it is an animal: if this is 
true, then it would be impossible to say what such an individual could still be if this 
foundation were removed, no matter how richly endowed the individual might be with 
other predicates, if, that is, this foundation can equally be called a predicate like any other’ 
(Hegel, Science of Logic, pp.36–7)6 
 Substance predicates are special then. They are concrete. They are not just a way an 
individual may be (red): but what the individual is (rose). They can support statements of natural 
law (‘a rose is a perennial flowering plant’) and normative statements (‘a wolf that does not disperse 
from its natal pack is defective’). They can be exemplified in individuals which have different 
properties. A contemporary development of this view can be found in the work of Philippa Foot 
and Michael Thompson, though they do not (so far as I know) deploy the exotic idiom of the 
concrete.7 But however exotic now, this notion remained a live, if flagging concern ‘nearer to 
home’ even up until 1930s, when Murdoch went up to Oxford. And this proximity to home is 
theoretically significant, at least where Murdoch exegesis is concerned. This is because as Stern 
(2007) argues – and here my exposition is indebted to his – the British Idealist conception of the 
concrete universal, while Hegelian, is not Hegel’s.  
 Very roughly8, Hegel’s conception is holistic insofar as what dialectically unifies the class 
of individuals as a kind is the fact that they each instantiate the concrete universal in their own 
determinate way; their each instantiating it though differently to each other is what makes them 
individuals of that kind. The holism of the British Idealists is different. Individuals instantiating a 
universal concretely are themselves inter-related. They are - almost incredibly - inter-related by the 
universal. Bradley offers a tellingly ‘esoteric’ example:  
By [both] being red-haired [..] two men are related really, and their relation is not merely 
external…‘But I am a red-haired man’, I shall hear, ‘and I know what I am, and I am not 
altered in fact when I am compared with another man, and therefore the relation falls 
outside.’ But no finite individual, I reply, can possibly know what he is, and the idea that 
all his reality falls within his knowledge is even ridiculous…But, as he really is, to know 
perfectly his own nature would be, with that nature, to pass in knowledge endlessly beyond 
himself. For example, a red-haired man who knew himself utterly would and must, starting 
from within, go on to know everyone else who has red hair, and he would not know 
himself until he knew them…Nothing in the whole and in the end can be external, and 
everything less than the Universe is an abstraction from the whole, an abstraction more or 
less empty, and the more empty the less self-dependent. Relations and qualities are 
abstractions, and depend for their being always on a whole, a whole which they inadequately express, and 
which remains always less or more in the background (Bradley 1908, pp. 580-581)9	  
I say a little about the distinction between internal and external relations as far as Murdoch’s 
epistemology goes in closing, though I say nothing at all about the fragile status of individuals in 
Bradley’s whole, which tends to monism, and which elsewhere, for this reason, Murdoch supposes 
“intolerable!” (MGM, p.491).10 For now, I will make a distinction that Stern borrows from 
Bosanquet and which is, I think, a handy gloss. I picture it below (again leaving aside all 
consideration of the ontology of the relations represented). The British Idealists conceived of the 
concrete universal as ‘the universal in the form of a world’ rather than in the form of a class. Where 
the universal has the form of a world (fig 2), individuals exemplifying it are inter-related and 
mutually interdependent.11 
 
 So, to answer the question ‘how “near to home”?’, it is likely that Murdoch is thinking of 
the British Idealists. While she certainly counts Hegel as a Platonic thinker – in the passage, recall, 
it is the Platonic tradition she has in mind - she criticizes his dialectical system as ‘omnivorous’, 
and in a way that would hardly seem apt to illustrate the treatment of concepts that she is 
recommending: 
 
 Hegel’s Reason proceeds by a continuous discarding of possibilities; doubts, ambiguities, 
 alternatives, ramblings of any kind are officially not permitted and cannot be left ‘lying 
 around’. Seen in this way, the process seems not an increasingly widening, increasingly 
 well-lighted all-embracing prospect, but rather an entry into some dark narrowing almost 
 mechanical confinement…. (MGM, p.227)12       
 The British Idealist alternative in contrast might well be thought have an embracive aura, 
at least as insofar as the universal is understood to form a world. And perhaps Murdoch is even 
thinking in particular of Bradley. We know that she writes about Bradley in her journals between 
1945 and 1948 and then again in 1951 when she reminds herself to re-read Bradley and see his 
attack on simple ideas. In Oxford, in the summer term of 1952, she gives as yet untraceable lectures 
on ‘Some Problems in Bradley' and she mentions that she is considering writing a book on him in 
two letters to Raymond Queneau dated that year.13 Tantalisingly, there are even literal audible rings 
between IP and Ethical Studies (though I do not suggest any conceptual attunement), and 
particularly essay VI on ‘Ideal Morality’: 
 Morality is an endless process and therefore a self-contradiction; and being such it does 
 not remain standing by itself, but feels the impulse to transcend its existing reality. It is a 
 self-contradiction in this way: it demands for what cannot be (1962, p.312)  
Scholarly work is needed to unearth these connections and echoes in full. In particular, we might 
draw on her journal writings as well as her 1992 comments on Bradley and wonder: How did 
Murdoch read Hegel and Bradley? Did she read the former through the latter? Given Bradley’s 
tendency towards monism, what dimensions of his scheme might have survived the caution 
sounded in her epigraph (she herself notes that she is monist by temperament (GG, p.50) – 
perhaps the epigraph is also a reminder to herself)? Finally, suppose Murdoch did prefer Bradley 
to Hegel (as the present paper assumes), would she have been justified in doing so? Since all these 
questions overrun any capacity I presently have to answer them (and until Murdoch’s Bradley 
lectures turn up),14 I return only to Murdoch’s rhetorical “why not indeed?”.  
 Murdoch wants, though does not argue for, the thought that all terms might be treated as 
concrete universals, including colour terms. I think it does not take much imagination to appreciate 
how the painter’s grasp of red should be progressive, and sustained by continuous, detailed 
conscious reflection on and attention to red in the world, an example she develops in the sentences 
following our passage. The child’s ‘red’ belongs to buses and postboxes, blood and apples. But 
what is ‘red’ for the great painter? His concept (she elsewhere mentions Cezanne) is deeply 
complicated and highly elaborated, an ‘increasingly widening’, ‘all-embracing prospect’ tied up, 
surely, with all the hues and light and shade and in substances of all kinds in all conditions and in 
living things and much more besides. The great artist treats ‘red’ as an individual object to be 
infinitely learned and his or her own grasp of it as infinitely perfectible. But ‘red’ is an abstract 
universal for Hegel.  
 Now, earlier I noted some biographical detail relevant to the thought that Murdoch’s 
concrete universal is in the form of an all-embracing world (not in the form of a class), but these 
dates are significant for another reason. This is the period when Murdoch is first exposed to 
Wittgenstein’s thought. Fragments of the Philosophical Investigations are passed to her by Elizabeth 
Anscombe. In 1948 she records reading it in a letter to a friend (‘it is like nothing on sea or land’).15 
And she helps Anscombe with aspects of the translation which appears in 1953.  John Haldane 
has written of Peter Geach that his precocious and ardent study of McTaggart (and in particular 
McTaggart’s treatment of community) may have prepared him for Wittgenstein’s later work. It is 
tempting to wonder whether Murdoch’s study of Bradley might not have imaginatively shaped her 
reception of Wittgenstein.16 And with that in mind, we can finally ask, though briefly (see Wiseman, 
this volume) ‘why moral terms?’  
 The emphasis on language is of course symptomatic of the general linguistic turn that 
animates mid-century analytic philosophy, but the import is peculiarly Wittgensteinean. Though 
words stay the same (and recall this may mislead us), the concepts those words express, when used 
by a historical individual, deepen over the course of a life and acquire structure. But on this view 
concepts are personal – the concept which an individual’s use of a word expresses on an occasion is 
a function of the user’s history. This understanding of concepts and words then – namely as 
expressive of concepts that are personal - contrasts with the genetic analysis of meaning, 
behaviorist in spirit, where words lock onto typical outward patterns. But it also diverges from an 
Ordinary Language approach to meaning, understood as an impersonal reservoir or network which 
anyone can dip into (p.29). But meaning is rarely ordinary for Murdoch; what everyday words 
mean becomes increasingly personal as an individual language user’s life unfolds. 
 
§2. An Analogy: The Standard Metre 
To draw out the respect in which Murdoch’s idealist-inflected notion of concrete universality is 
also Wittgensteinean, I offer an analogy. This follows Murdoch’s own tendency. Unlike early and 
exuberant positivists such as the young A.J. Ayer, Murdoch does not suppose that metaphysical 
statements are nonsense because unverifiable. Instead she recognizes that their apparent 
unverifiability should point us in another direction – certain metaphysical truths need to be spoken 
about analogically or metaphorically.  Beauty is an exception: “I can experience the transcendence 
of the beautiful, but (I think) not the transcendence of the good” (GG, p.60). Her analogization 
of the Good (invulnerable and ‘higher’, distant) to the sun is the most avid, if notorious expression 
of her Platonism. Motivated partly by a cue in “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’’, the second paper in 
Sovereignty, I instead explore a comparison of the Good with the Standard Metre: 
 It may seem curious to wonder whether the idea of perfection (as opposed to the idea 
 of merit or improvement) is really an important one, and what sort of role it can play. 
 Well, is it important to measure and compare things to know just how good they are? In 
 any field which interests or concerns us I think we would say yes. A deep understanding 
 of any field of human activity (painting, for instance) involves an increasing revelation of 
 degrees of excellence and often a revelation of there being in fact little that is very good 
 and nothing that is perfect. Increasing understanding of human conduct operates in a 
 similar way. We come to perceive scales, distances, standards, and may incline to see as 
 less than excellent what previously we were prepared to ‘let by’. The idea of perfection 
 works thus within a field of study, producing an increasing sense of direction […] The 
 idea of perfection is also a natural producer of order. In its light we come to see that A, 
 which superficially resembles B, is really better than B. And this can occur, indeed must 
 occur, without our having the sovereign idea in any sense ‘taped’. In fact, is in its nature 
 that we cannot get it taped. This is the true sense of the ‘indefinability’ of the good [.] (GG, 
 p.62) 
 Both the idea of perfection and the Good are noted here. Absolute good has the attribute 
of being perfect. The idea of perfection moves us in the direction of the idea perfected. I say more 
about the relation between the idea of perfection, and the Good (as I understand it) below. For 
now, reconsider Murdoch’s incredulity at Hampshire’s supposition that ‘to copy a right action is 
to act rightly’. 
 There ought to be profound difficulties here by Murdoch’s reckoning. I need to know 
which action is right (this is an epistemic problem, which human psychology makes immensely, if 
not intractably difficult thinks Murdoch – ‘What is the form that I am supposed to copy?). I need 
to know what particular course I should take at context (a pragmatic problem which is augmented by 
specificities of space and time and by politics). And both difficulties are at once compounded when 
an unrealistic concept empiricism is replaced by a treatment of concepts as private concrete 
universals, where a historical individual, not a Kantian agent, attempts to copy that which they 
settle on, with difficulty, as ‘right’ (or good). For instance, suppose ‘I want to write like 
Shakespeare’. To borrow Murdoch’s way of framing things that is all very well to say. Copying cannot 
be in question here: “beyond the details of craft and criticism there is only the magnetic non-
representable idea of the good which remains not ‘empty’ so much as mysterious. And thus too in 
the sphere of human conduct”; “one has got to do the thing oneself alone and differently” (p.63)17 
 The analogy I want to develop takes off from a certain indefinability that pertains also to 
the Standard Metre. Wittgenstein remarks of that peculiar, individual thing: 
 There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is a metre long, nor that it is not one 
 metre long, and that is the Standard Metre in Paris. – But this is, of course, not to ascribe 
 any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of 
 measuring with a metre rule (Philosophical Investigations, §50, p.25) 
 As Diamond (2001) explains, this treatment of an individual marks a divergence from a 
Tractarian view whereby language describes what is the case by compounds of names. Things 
named cannot be said to be or not to be; what is the case only are facts - a feature of the view that 
we know chimed readily with and by turns inspired the positivist emphasis on verification. But 
there is no procedure to verify whether the Standard Metre is a metre long, or so it might be thought. 
Kripke disagrees: “This seems a very ‘extraordinary property’, actually” (Kripke, Naming and Necessity 
1980, p.54). (What relevance this lengthy quotation serves will hopefully become plain later): 
 
Part of the problem which is bothering Wittgenstein is, of course, that this stick serves as a 
standard of length and so we can’t attribute length to it. Be this as it may (well, it may not be), is 
the statement ‘stick S is one meter long’, a necessary truth? Of course, its length might vary in 
time. We could make the definition more precise by stipulating that one meter is to be the length 
of S at time t0. Is it then a necessary truth that stick S is one meter long at time t0? Someone who 
thinks that everything one knows a priori is necessary might think: ‘This is the definition of a 
meter. By definition, stick S is one meter long at t0. That’s a necessary truth.’ But there seems to 
me no reason so to conclude, even for a man who uses the stated definition of ‘one meter’. For 
he’s using this definition not to give the meaning of what he called the ‘meter’, but to fix the 
reference. […] There is a certain length which he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an 
accidental property, namely that there is a stick of that length. Someone else might mark out the 
same reference by another accidental property. But in any case, even though he uses this to fix 
the reference of his standard of length, a meter, he can still say, if heat had been applied to this 
stick S at t0, then at t0 stick S would not have been one meter long. (ibid) 
 
 Now, for Diamond, Kripke makes two mis-steps here, at least so far as Wittgenstein 
exegesis goes. First, he misunderstands Wittgenstein’s point concerning the Standard’s peculiar 
role in the language-game of measuring with a metre rule. But he also makes an attendant mistake 
about the intelligibility of the notion of identity when applied to length. Consider: There is 
something odd about the person who in response to the question ‘How tall are you?’ puts their 
hand on their head and says ‘This tall’!  Why so?  
 On the one hand, they seem to have a notion of length as intransitive – as something that 
can be made sense of without appeal to a metric, that is by comparison with some other thing. 
Rather, they seem to suppose that their length is the length of the space they fill, something which 
has a ‘length’ tout court. On the other hand, they recognize that length is a peculiarly transitive 
notion. Things are reckoned to have length only in relation to other things, with which, along that 
dimension, they can be compared, a dimension which thereby becomes available. The oddness of the 
present case then is that the self-measuring subject is using themselves as their own Standard but 
this ‘Standard’ can’t play a role in the game of measuring which involves comparing lengths of 
different, other things. 
 It is plain that Kripke has an intransitive conception of length in mind. He supposes that 
we use a rod to fix on a length at time t, which we thereafter designate as the Standard Metre. It is 
a priori that the Standard Metre is a metre, though it only contingently had that length – we could 
have chosen another rod. But again what the oddness of the above case shows is that we cannot 
chose just anything. This is because the Standard Metre only has ‘life’ in the context of certain 
practices that themselves have a form – practices of measuring, comparing, sizing up etc. Manifold 
other artefacts articulate these materially and must themselves be mastered - pencils, protractors, 
fences, lasers. And countless other practices intersect with these practices and artefacts and sustain 
them and make them intelligible. But critically the same is true of the concept ‘length’. On this 
view, the concept ‘length’ has no life independently of these practices. So, there is no intransitive 
notion that regions of empty space (say) can be said to have, as a property, tout court. And yet the 
intransitive conception is crucial for Kripke. I return to intransitivity below. For now, I sketch the 
analogy I have in mind (sketch being a fair designation I hope – the link is presented only 
schematically). 
 Suppose metre sticks everywhere form a class. They are all individuals that are 
particularisations of the universal ‘metre stick’ understood concretely – the universal is not a way 
those individuals could be (a metre long, a length which manifold other things have). It is what 
they are. This treatment doesn’t say anything about the special role of the Standard Metre, as a 
standard, in forming the class. But here we could follow Kripke: Not all individuals are created 
equal. Some are anointed, and these individuals so baptized bring about the possibility of 
univeralisation and so normativity insofar as the unanointed resemble the anointed.   
 On the Wittgensteinean alternative by contrast, the emphasis is not on individual things 
(which could be one way or another) or on classes of things, but on the forms of life in which those 
things participate and which thereby come to constitute the form of a world. In the case of the 
Standard Metre, there are forms of life that are intelligible in light of it and that can go on because 
of it. So, there is, in this respect, an inter-relation between the diverse acts of measuring, lining and 
sizing up and so on that make up the ‘world-form’ which the Standard Metre sustains. That is, 
there is an inter-relation between the child in the playground lining up sticks, the baker weighing 
flour, and the astronomer and her telescope. On this view, other material metre sticks, where they 
exist, are related to the Standard and have a length not because they form a class, but because they 
are interrelated through the forms of life that the Standard Metre sustains and the practices in 
which they participate and make possible. 
 Now, Murdoch insists that it is important to measure and compare things to know just 
how good they are. But unlike the length of something which can easily be measured, at least by 
one who participates in the form of life where such a practice is sustained, it is often (though not 
always) difficult to tell if something is good (Which form am I supposed to copy?). Certainly 
goodness cannot be verified. But here our ideas of perfection can move us in some direction of 
assessment and of measurement, Murdoch thinks. At the same time, recall, these ideas themselves 
deepen and become elaborated with the progress of a life - I have a different image of courage at 
forty than I had a twenty. But accordingly the acts and people that fall under that description ought 
not to be conceived to form a class; they do not resemble.18 Rather I come to see them as related as 
my idea of courage deepens. And I come to see that quality (courage) as related to others (honesty), 
and I see those qualities and their manifestations against the backgrounds in which they appear 
which I also come to appreciate in ever increasing particularity and detail (what looked like 
reticence was honesty). My concern, that is, widens, ramifies and complicates; it becomes detailed. 
But it also modulates. For as part of this ever-widening process some connections are sundered as 
reassessment prompts redescription (what looked courageous was foolhardy). And this shifting is 
endless and ongoing. And for Murdoch where the movement is towards knowledge of what is 
real, the achievement is moral. 
 There is a great deal more to say here – I have simplified to a very large degree. Indeed, I 
have oversimplified. But I want to keep the analogy itself uncomplicated and schematic for now. 
This is because it is easy to at once raise a problem for my exegesis and analogy – at least so far as 
the Wittgensteinean dimensions of Murdoch’s concrete universal are concerned. 
 
 
§3 A difficulty  
 
I have suggested that the idea of perfection acts as a standard, one’s grasp of which, and evolution 
towards shifts and alters and can be deepened over the progress of a life. Good reigns sovereign 
here, since just as the Standard Metre gives life to diverse but inter-related practices (weighing, 
sizing up etc. etc.), the Good ‘gives life’ to “all our struggles for truth and virtue” (MGM, p.38). 
Murdoch’s analogy with the Sun is naturally invited here. It is distant and separate. Things go on 
in its light and because of it. We know “more or less where the sun is” (GG, p.70); but we cannot 
look at it. But likewise with Murdoch’s Good. It cannot be defined or represented, but “we are 
not usually in doubt about the direction in which the Good lies” (SGC, p.97). To be good, to act 
well, can be an object of intention, even where one does not know ‘what form to copy’; “Good is 
the focus of attention when an intent to be virtuous co-exists (as perhaps it almost always does) 
with some unclarity of vision” (GG, p.70) Absolute good is perfect for Murdoch. It is the pinnacle 
of our idea of perfection. But just as there are many different ways to measure - exemplified in 
different ways by particular historical individuals at particular places and with whatever is to hand 
- there are many different ways of being good. e.g. courageous, kind, insightful, creative, generous 
and so on.19 All of these ways are differently realized at different times and places by different 
individuals living their own lives. But as our grasp of moral concepts deepen, regulated by the idea 
of the individual concept perfected – i.e. the idea of courage – we can come to see, though dimly 
and with difficulty, those differing ways as themselves interrelated manifestations of the same virtue 
or quality, and those in turn as inter-related manifestations of the Good.  
 
Good as absolute, above courage and generosity and all the plural virtues is to be seen as 
unshadowed and separate, a pure source, the principle which creatively relates the virtues to 
each other in our moral lives. In the iconoclastic pilgrimage, …we experience the distance which 
separates us from perfection and are led to place our idea of it in a figurative sense outside the 
turmoil of existent being. (MGM, p.507) 
 
 I cannot say anything about Murdoch’s epistemology here, but it seems she takes our 
knowledge of the transcendence of the Good to be certain. This is coupled with a view of human 
psychology which makes the iconoclastic pilgrimage she describes difficult. Indeed, the very fact 
of this process is ‘proof’ for Murdoch of the existence of the Good.  
 But now a difficulty for the analogy I am proposing. My way of getting the measure of  
Murdoch’s Good relies on the notion of a form of life – the Standard Metre is that in light of 
which certain forms of life are intelligible and go on. But in Metaphysics as Guide to Morals, Murdoch 
is starkly critical of this notion and in a way that is more than reminiscent of her criticism of Hegel’s 
dialectic. Lebensformen are ‘rigid’ (p.273); Wittgenstein’s Investigations is as much a ‘cage’ as the 
Tractatus – “there is a feeling of constraint” (ibid). Forms of life “freeze” a quasi-logical picture of 
language as a spatio-temporal phenomenon, which is instead “a colossal, infinitely various creative 
ferment” (p.275).  Most seriously, “[t]he Lebensform concept suggests the loss of the individual” 
(p.281) – but the problem of individuality was where our discussion began! 
 At the same time, Murdoch also attributes to Wittgenstein a certain kind of moral 
injunction that is addressed to philosophers: ‘Do not try to analyse your own inner experience’ 
(Investigations II xi, p.204). It might be thought that Murdoch is reading this injunction seriously 
and is mistakenly attributing a constructive philosophy to Wittgenstein where this is not his 
purpose.20 But what Murdoch objects to is a philosophical picture. She thinks Wittgenstein is 
urging a philosophical picture that discredits the density and real existence of inner life. To see the 
significance of this, it is helpful to return to an early passage that almost has the status now of 
proverb (at least in Murdoch studies) where Murdoch articulates what she thinks the task of moral 
philosophy is. She writes “man is a creature who makes pictures of himself and then comes to 
resemble the picture” (‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, E&M, p.75). This, she thinks, is the process that 
moral philosophy needs to describe and to analyse. And it is surely what her own critique of 
Wittgenstein amounts to. The philosophical picture Wittgenstein paints, when taken up a certain 
way – by the analytic behaviourist existentialist for whom consciousness is ‘empty’ and the will is 
all – risks the loss of certain concepts: those of the Good, love, consciousness and attention. But 
this loss amounts not just to a way of describing the world, but as Mark Hopwood insightfully 
comments, “the loss of a way of being in it”, a loss that is of moral concern (2019, p.255). And this is 
because, if I am on the right track, the way in which a person comes to resemble the pictures he 
makes and valorizes is not best understood as a matter copying those pictures. It is by coming to 
see the world in light of them; it is by seeing the world in terms of what the picture relates. Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical picture, the way it was taken up by many mid-century Oxford philosophers, relates 
things in a way that obfuscates certain details and so precipitates their loss.  
 But this way of reading Murdoch’s criticism suggests a different way of elucidating the 
analogy – one that I think rescues the centrality of the historical individual from the “cage” or 
apparent rigidity and inflexibility of forms of life. 
 
§4 A suggestion 
 
To return to the passage that this paper treats, the reader might now see that I myself have missed 
out a detail. When Murdoch comments that nothing she is saying is new, she notes that similar 
things are commonplaces of “the Christian ethic, whose centre is an individual”. In what way 
might Christ, an individual, be considered ‘a centre’? 
 It might be thought that moral exemplars are historical individuals that are central to an 
ethic insofar as they are to be copied or imitated – to wit, they are anointed as the standard to 
copy. But the picture I am building suggests something different, and here I draw on Donald 
MacKinnon’s The Problem of Metaphysics to explain how, a work which in my view Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals offers a response to. 
 While Murdoch herself makes no reference to the Standard Metre so far as I know, 
MacKinnon observes the “genuine analogy” he finds between the role of the just man or just city 
in Plato’s ethics and the Standard Metre , though commenting that while the Standard Metre can 
be destroyed, the form of justice is indestructible - here he references Peter Geach’s discussion of 
the Parmenides, which explicitly refers to Wittgenstein on the Standard. He then makes a curious 
move, which from the perspective of my analogy is important. He notes that Plato, at the beginning 
of the Parmenides, rejects the concept of the forms as noemata. But he, MacKinnon, wants to take 
this possibility seriously, and so, I think, does Murdoch. Murdoch’s ideas of perfection are ways of 
looking at the world, if infinitely perfectible ways. 
 
Very early in the Parmenides, Plato rejects out of hand the suggestion that the forms may be 
regarded as noemata; it is such passages that have helped earn for the critics of constructivism 
in modern philosophy of mathematics, the name of Platonists. But in rejecting the suggestion 
that his forms are noemata, Plato is implicitly rejecting any treatment of his doctrine as a way of 
looking at the world (PM, p.160) 
 
MacKinnon develops two examples which help crystallise a conception of form as noematic. One 
focuses on his experience of the 1941 painting Totes Meer, by artist Paul Nash, which can be viewed 
today in Room 9 of Tate Britain.21 He writes of this painting, which he treats as a landscape: 
 
 “[I]n it the painter realised as a vast Sargasso sea a great dump in which the wreckage of 
combat aircraft, both British and German had been deposited….It so happened that after 
I had seen several reproductions of this painting I passed the dump between East Oxford 
and Garsington which had provided the artist with the subject-matter of his composition. 
I knew that it was there that Nash had found his subject, when I myself passed the place, 
and I recall vividly that my perceptual experience was deeply effected, indeed suffused by 
memory of the painting I had seen reproduced. I might say that ‘I saw’ the dump as ‘the 
dead sea’…that I saw more, and in the seeing was made aware of the sheer waste of what, 
conveyed by the works of human ingenuity, was wrecked and destroyed….one would not 
exaggerate to say that the painter had made an experience possible for the percipient…he brings out the 
inwardness of the scene by enabling us so to see it…he does so not simply by eliciting the 
richness of what he views but rather by offering his vision as a supremely effective judgment 
on the civilisation whose fruits are there displayed before his eyes” (my emphasis, 1974, p.161) 
 
On this conception, the artwork, displaying the artist’s way of looking, his vision, makes possible, 
an experience for the percipient which would not otherwise have been possible.  
 His second example concerns Christ, the centre of the Christian ethic. Christ is not treated 
as a moral exemplar; his life is not considered an illustration of a principle to be copied. Instead, 
it is presented as making possible a certain life. While the artist makes possible a way of seeing, 
contemplation of the life of Christ (by those who as he puts it ‘receive’ the tale of the life of Jesus 
as a means of coming to see the world in a certain way) ‘thrusts on human notice’ a pattern that is 
only made available through the action of the individual “through whom in history it is achieved” 
(p.163). 
 Murdoch’s analysis is secular, but her treatment of the legacy of Wittgenstein as well as her 
repeated notice of our picture-making tendencies, and in particular, where philosophy is 
concerned, metaphysics as “image-play” (SGCp.77), resonates with this conception in ways I can 
only gesture at here. Pictures, theories and models make possible for us certain kinds of 
experiences as well certain kinds of lives.  And they do this, not because they illustrate principles to 
be copied, nor even because of what they show. But because of what they relate. The “great 
surprising variety of the world” can be made intelligible and can be seen in light of them – for it is 
thrust upon our notice by the form of work, itself an achievement of a historical individual (or, as 
it might be, a collective of individuals). This partly explains Murdoch’s preference for realism in 
art as well her contention, which I cannot broach here, that both great art and morality have a 
common source in a capacity to direct attention to reality, a capacity which, for Murdoch, is love. 
But pictures also obfuscate and diminish too - that which is thrust upon our notice is so thrust at 
the expense of detail elsewhere; detail that is fine-grained, particular, impossible to depict. And 
that is why, as Murdoch puts it, we must grow by looking. We always apprehend more than we 
understand – the detail of our experience is rich and always particular, which is why our ideas are 
infinitely perfectible. In the case of Wittgenstein’s extraordinary creative achievement, the way in 
which his philosophical picture relates – or seems to - especially where this picture is realised as a 
method in philosophy, risks, for Murdoch, the loss of a central feature of our moral lives and 
humanity: the inner. At the same time, Murdoch follows Wittgenstein. Look, don’t think.  
   
 
§5 Murdoch’s realism  
 
I have offered a very early, and tentative approach to reading Murdoch’s conception of the 
concrete universal, though perhaps only to raise more questions than I can answer. To continue 
that trend, I want to say something in closing about Murdoch’s realism which will, I hope, at least 
unify some of the still distinct threads running unconnected through the paper. 
 If I am on the right track, Murdoch’s take on the concrete universal is inflected by both 
Wittgenstein and British Idealism. Since the latter is Hegelian, we ought not be surprised to find 
fragments of the original also animating Murdoch’s thought, itself notoriously omnivorous – and 
it is here of course that the ideas of history and progress have a home. However, I have suggested, 
without defending the thought, that concepts are akin to noemata for Murdoch – they are ways of 
looking that can be perfected. Here formal objects, including philosophical theories, the lives of 
individuals and Art have a special generative role to play; not because they illustrate principles to 
copy but because of the ways in which they make the world intelligible in light of them and the 
forms of life and experience they sustain or make possible. 
 Earlier, I left aside all discussion of the nature of the relations that connect the idealist 
concrete universal. For Murdoch however, if the image of her philosophy that I am projecting is 
to have traction, and is to make sense within her wider ethical picture and moral philosophy, at 
least some of the relations which our elaborated concepts picture or represent must be external. 
We are distinct and separated from other individuals and things. We are spatio-temporally limited, 
and our experience is likewise. We encounter but a small fraction of the world, ever contingent 
and subject to change. Our situation is tragic.22 But to this extent perhaps there are aspects of the 
Kripkean treatment of the metre stick which we would do well to recover. 
 Recall, for Kripke, it is contingent which rod we choose as our standard. Likewise, for 
Murdoch it is largely contingent which picture (noemata) we choose to put ‘in the archives’ and by 
whose lights we choose to live our lives individually and collectively. Some pictures are false – they 
are valorized by a false love, or they are the emanations of a false and corrupting system (Capitalism 
for instance; there are glimmers of Murdochian Marxism throughout Sovereignty). In such cases, the 
lives that such false pictures make possible can at best only make room for false forms of 
transcendence. “False conceptions are often generalized, stereotyped and unconnected. True 
conceptions combine just modes of judgment and ability to connect with an increased perception 
of detail” (SGC, p.96). 
 At the same time, Murdoch takes it that we really do have an intransitive conception of the 
Good. And this is where she agrees with G.E. Moore. The Good is sovereign. We are certain of its 
existence and primitively oriented in its direction. Despite our fallen, easily corruptible human 
nature, despite our limited ideas, infinitely perfectible, we feel it’s magnetic pull. This is 
metaphysics: “there is more than this”; “the spark is real” (GG, p.73).23 
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1 Some exceptions are Merritt (2017, p.9) and Bagnoli (2012, p.222). I will use the abbreviations (IP) for ‘The Idea of 
Perfection’; (GG) for ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good’’; (SGC) for ‘The Sovereignty of the Good over Other Concepts’. 
MGM stands for Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, and E&M for Existentialists and Mystics. 
2 Bob Stern notes in email correspondence that Kant expresses the same worry about moral exemplars in the 
Groundwork 4:408-9 – could it be that Murdoch is thinking here of Kant? 
3 See ‘On God and Good’ (1970, p.53) 
4 In November 1982, Murdoch records in her journal that she has received the kind of letter she’d been hoping for 
after her Gifford Lecture: it records the impact her lectures had had on the Gifford audience as only matched by 
two other lecturers, one of whom was Donald MacKinnon. Thank you to Dayna Miller, archivist at the Murdoch 
Archives in Kingston for help with this reference. 
5 Quoted in Stern (2007, p.128), fn 38. 
6 Quoted in Stern (2007, p.128), fn 40. 
7 For discussion see Stern (2016). 
8 My discussion is hugely elementary – I refer the interested reader to Bob Stern’s brilliant (2007) paper for detailed 
and lucid exposition.  
9 Also quoted in Stern (2007, p.124). 
10 Thank you to Bob Stern for pointing out this fragility which is plainly relevant to an adequate development of the 
position I sketch in this paper, but which I do not treat here.  
11 See Stern (2007, p.122). 
12 It might be wondered whether Murdoch is reading Hegel through Bradley here – a matter for scholars of all three. 
13 Her friend Richard Wollheim, a little younger than her, ends up writing one. Bradley is somewhat ‘in the air’. 
14 All of this paper is deeply indebted to correspondence with Bob Stern over the course of two years – including 
detailed comments and reflection on the present piece. 
15 Letter to Hal Lidderdale, 1948. 
16 McTaggart also wrote on Hegel’s Logic – there is a question then to what extent Geach’s reception of 
Wittgenstein, particularly in Mental Acts, has Hegelian undertones. 
17 Here the point is that one cannot be what Shakespeare is – i.e. a great writer – by copying him.  
18 For Bob Stern, a better Wittgensteinean analogy would use the notion of resemblance – namely the idea of family 
resemblance. The concept of a game (for instance) might be treated as a concrete universal insofar as all its concrete 
manifestations cannot be reduced to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, though they all resemble in some 
way. It is true that the metre stick analogy does not line up so favourably with this alternative, since it might be 
thought that a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for being a metre stick is to resemble the standard in Paris. The 
way I pitched the analogy with the metre stick is however different. On a class conception, which admittedly is 
somewhat artefactual (and here the game conception is, I think, to be preferred) it is allowed that different metre 
sticks are individual metre sticks insofar as they particularisations of the universal, metre stick, which is essentially 
concrete. But my analogy was meant to emphasize rather a conception of a universal in the form of a world, albeit 
read through a Wittgensteinean lens. So understood, the idea of a game is treated as what sustains and makes 
possible a huge range of interlocking practices and the associated skills, and indeed virtues and moral concepts 
associated with those practices. On this view, while there is no family resemblance between a child playing 
tiddlywinks, an octogenarian checking the racing results in a local newspaper and an adolescent’s dejection at not 
being selected for a squad because of a tendency to cheat, those events, episodes and histories are related. A 
different way of approaching this same thought is to consider what areas of human life would vanish with the loss 
of the concept of a game. It is hardly imaginable. What a game is, amounts to, on this view, is not limited to a 
                                               
                                                                                                                                                  
clustering of various activities whose particular instantiations might intelligibly fall (including metaphorically) under 
the description ‘game’.  
19 It might be objected that there are not many different ways to measure. Yes, I can measure metres in lots of 
different contexts, but insofar as I am measuring in metres, there is not variability here. My point however concerns 
measuring practices, which are multifarious and which can be more of less expert. The thought is that the idea of a 
standard sustains the intelligibility of these which are interrelated because of the standard – ‘in light of it’. 
20 For excellent discussion of this charge see Søndergaard Christensen (2019) 
21 Or online here: https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/nash-totes-meer-dead-sea-n05717 
22 See especially ‘The Sublime and the Good’, and ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’, in E&M. 
23 Thank you to Bob Stern for his extraordinary intellectual generosity; to both Andre Muller and Andrew Bowyer 
for sharing their work on Donald MacKinnon with me, which I think promises to unlock so much in Murdoch; to 
Dayna Millar for helping me with material in the Murdoch archives (I’m so grateful); to my colleagues Joe Saunders 
and Jeremy Dunham and everyone who participated in the Durham Concrete Universal Workshop; to the 
organisers and audience at the Murdoch Centenary Conference in Kingston, Canada, and particularly to David 
Bakhurst, Lesley Jamieson and Jacqueline Maxwell; and especially to Rachael Wiseman for insightful conversation 
on all of this over many years. 
